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ABSTRACT
Using proprietary data on equity lending supply, loan fees and quantities we examine the link be-
tween institutionalownership structure and the market for equity lending and stock prices. We ﬁnd
that both total institutional ownership and ownership concentration - measured by the Herﬁndahl
index, single largest holding, and number of investors - are important determinants of equity lend-
ing supply and short sale constraints. More concentrated ownership structures increase short sale
constraints - including loan fees, recall risk and arbitrage risk - and forces arbitrageurs to decrease
demand for equity borrowing and demand greater compensation for borrowing stock. The results
suggest that the impact of institutional ownership structure in the equity lending market creates
limits to arbitrage.
Keywords: Equity lending markets, short selling, ownership structure, lending supply, arbitrage
risk.
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1Introduction
An active market for lending and borrowing stock is important for efﬁcient stock prices. Yet, an
active market depends on active participants. Participants’ demand for borrowing stock arises for
hedging reasons or because an investor group concludes that stocks are overvalued. Supply for
lending stock must arise from current owners choosing to lend their holdings in return for a fee.
Why do stockholders participate in lending stock? One possible answer is that the longer invest-
ment horizon and lower portfolio turnover of institutional investors (like pension funds, insurance
companies and index funds) make them choose to generate extra income by lending securities in
exchange for a fee. However, there has been little to no empirical investigation into which institu-
tional owners lend stock and, in turn, what impact this has on the market for equity lending.
In this paper we examine if ownership structure affects the market for lending and borrowing
stock. We use a proprietary panel data set consisting of equity lending supply, loan prices and
quantities from January 2005 to June 2008. Institutional ownership data is used to identify stocks
with large individual investors or concentrated ownership and we present four main results.
First, we show that institutionalownership concentration negativelyimpacts stock lending sup-
ply, after controlling for total institutional ownership. Second, we examine the effect that owner-
ship concentration has on the relationship between ownership levels and lending supply. We split
our sample according to concentration quintiles and compare the impact of total ownership on
lending supply between the smallest and largest quintiles of ownership concentration, ﬁnding that
for high levels of concentration the impact of total ownership on lending supply is weakened. For
ﬁrms with the most concentrated ownership structure, total ownership is insigniﬁcant in explaining
lending supply.
Third, we switch attention to the economic costs of borrowing stock on measures of short
sale constraints. We test whether the loan fee and loan fee volatility are higher for ﬁrms with
2high concentration and lower total ownership and if institutional ownership structure affects the
likelihood of a stock becoming “special” in the lending supply market (i.e. it is costly to borrow).1
We also test if ownership structure affects loan recall risk through the type of lending contract (i.e.
ﬁxed-term or open-ended) and if arbitrage risk is higher for ﬁrms with higher concentration and
smaller total ownership. Arbitrage risk measures the stock return volatility that is non-diversiﬁable
and costlyfor arbitrageurs, beinga proxyfor limitsofarbitrage [Wurglerand Zhuravskaya(2002)].
Overall, our ﬁndings are that total ownership relieves constraints, while ownership concentration
increases the costs of borrowing equity and raises limits to arbitrage.
Fourth, we examine the demand for borrowing stock and its impact on stock returns. We hy-
pothesize that arbitrageurs internalize the effects of ownership on lending supply and short sale
constraints and, in turn, update their own demand curve. Speciﬁcally, for stocks with concentrated
ownership, borrowing demand should decrease and returns should be higher to compensate arbi-
trageurs for the increased risk. We employ the methodology proposed by Cohen, Diether, and
Malloy (2007) to identify demand shifts using price-quantity pairs. In logit regressions, we ﬁnd
that total ownership increases (decreases) and concentration decreases (increases) the likelihood
of an outward (inward) demand shift. Furthermore, we ﬁnd that where an outward demand shift
occurs for a stock with concentrated ownership, abnormal returns are more negative to compen-
sate arbitrageurs for higher limits to arbitrage and borrowing costs. These results suggest a link
between the limits to arbitrage and ownership structure, which to the best of our knowledge has
not been explored previously.
In robustness checks, we rule out several alternative hypotheses. We show that our results hold
for alternate measures of concentration employing the largest institutional ownership holding, that
do not rely on thenumberof institutionalinvestors. We show that theresults are robust to the useof
a GMM estimator that corrects for the bias arising in ﬁxed effect estimations of dynamic models.
1This term is due to the fact that these stocks are usually put on a “special” list that is closely followed by investors.
3Turning to the relationship between ownership structure and demand shifts, we re-examine the
result that for stocks with concentrated ownership, borrowing demand decreases and returns are
higher to compensate arbitrageurs for the increased risk. We rule out both the alternate hypothesis
that the result is due to institutional investors and participants in the market for borrowing stock
responding to news, and reverse causality.
As a taster of our main results, Figure 1 presents evidence that ownership structure affects eq-
uity lending markets and arbitrage risk. Sorting ﬁrms into twenty-ﬁve equal sized portfolios based
on total institutional ownership and ownership concentration quintiles each quarter, we examine
the cross-group differences in lending supply, loan fees, and arbitrage risk. Panel A of Figure
1 shows how equity lending supply is increasing in total ownership but decreasing in ownership
concentration. Ownership concentration has a greater effect on supply where ownership is lower.
Supply is, on average, greatest in thehigh-ownershiplow-concentrationportfolio(26.9%)and low-
est in the low-ownership high-concentration portfolio (3.8%). In Panel B, annualized loan fees are
plotted against total ownership and concentration. Fees decrease in total ownership and increase
in ownership concentration, and these results are ampliﬁed by concentration and total ownership
respectively. The maximum average fee is 166bps in the low-ownership high-concentration port-
folio, compared with a minimum average fee of 13.5bps in the high-ownership low-concentration
portfolio. In Panel C, we plot arbitrage risk. We ﬁnd that arbitrage risk is signiﬁcantly higher
where both ownership is more concentrated and total ownership is lower. The ﬁgure illustrates that
not only is ownership important, but that the interaction of total ownership and concentration has
an impact of equity lending and limits to arbitrage.
As motivationfor ownership structure impactingshort sale constraints we refer to the Thomson
Corp acquisition of Reuters. When Thomson Corp, the family-controlled Canadian data group,
acquired Reuters in the summer of 2007, the new group became a dual-listed company, trading
shares in London and Toronto. The Thomson family continued to own 55% of shares on the
4Toronto exchange. Following the conclusion of the deal in April 2008 the London listing has
traded on average at a 15 per cent discount to the Toronto quote. The Financial Times reported
“One factor was that the high concentration of the Thomson family’s stake in Canada limited
liquidity in Toronto, beneﬁting the price by restricting opportunities for borrowing stock to sell
short”, and that despite the twins arbitrage strategy of shorting Toronto-listed stocks and buying
London-listed stocks, “6 per cent of the London line was on loan as of Friday, according to Data
Explorers, compared to 5.4 per cent in Toronto”.2
We are not the ﬁrst to consider the beneﬁts of actively constraining short sales. Lamont (2004)
showsthatoverpricingincreaseswhen ﬁrmsdeliberatelyraisethelevelofshortsaleconstraints. He
describes one possibleaction “Firms can coordinate with shareholders to withdraw shares from the
stock lending market, thus preventing short selling by causing loan recall.” The Thomson-Reuters
example describes a speciﬁc example of this: a family ﬁrm, where the ﬁrm and shareholders re-
stricting supply are the same decision maker. However, the extension to any shareholder choosing
to constrain supply - whether acting alone or with ﬁrms - is obvious.
The paper is organized as follows. Section I places our work in the context of the existing
literature on short sales and ownership structure. Section II describes data and outlines our main
hypotheses between equity lending variables and ownership structure. Section IV presents results.
Finally, Section V concludes.
I. Literature Review
Exploiting arbitrage opportunities often involves short sales of mispriced securities. The inability
to locate securities to borrow can contribute to the persistence of price inefﬁciencies and prevent
information revelation, making ﬁnancial markets more inefﬁcient and changing equilibrium asset
2“How parochialism hampered Thomson Reuters”, Financial Times, June 24 2009, and “Concern over Thomson
Reuters’ UK listing”, Financial Times, January 9 2009.
5prices. There is a large body of academic research studying how short selling affects stock returns
and market efﬁciency. Miller (1977) shows how short selling constraints lead to overvaluation
due to the absence of pessimistic investors from the market. Diamond and Verrecchia (1987)
propose a model in which short-sale constraints eliminate some informative trades. Prices are not
biased upwards, but become less efﬁcient when restrictions are in place, as they reduce the speed
of adjustment to private information. Dufﬁe, Garleanu, and Pedersen (2002) develop a model in
which search costs and bargaining over loan fees generate endogenous short-sale constraints and
affect asset prices.
Empirically, most studies use short interest (i.e the amount of common stock held in short po-
sitions)as proxy of short sales constraints, ﬁnding that stocks with high short interest exhibit lower
subsequent returns [see for example Figlewski and Webb (1993); Desai, Ramesh, Thiagarajan, and
Balachandran (2002); Jones and Lamont (2002); Asquith, Pathak, and Ritter (2004); Diether, Lee,
and Werner (2005); Boehme, Danielsen, and Sorescu (2006); Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang (2008);
and Akbas, Boehmer, Erturk, and Sorescu (2008)]
Measures of market efﬁciency like volatility, bid-ask spreads, skewness have also received
attention. Reed (2007) studies rebate rates in the equity lending market as a proxy for short-sale
constraints and shows that stock prices are slower to incorporate information when borrowing fees
are high. Nagel (2005) uses institutional ownership as a proxy for short sale constraints and ﬁnds
that constrained stocks exhibit lowerreturns and that both information ﬂow and price efﬁciency are
adversely affected by short sale constraints. Internationally, Bris, Goetzmann, and Zhu (2007) use
regulatory information to conclude that stock prices in countries with constraints are less efﬁcient
than those where investors are allowed to short stocks. Safﬁ and Sigurdsson (2008) study the
relationship between stock price efﬁciency and lending supply in international markets, ﬁnding
that stocks with low lending supply or high loan fees are associated with smaller price efﬁciency.
The temporary ban on short selling imposed by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
6in July and September 2008 spurred lots of research on the market impact of such regulatory
restrictions.3 Bris (2008) ﬁnds that the July 15th, 2008 ban on naked short-selling (i.e. shorting
shares before securing the borrowing of securities for delivery) of a subset of ﬁnancial ﬁrms in the
U.S. did not prevent negativeperformance and reduced intra-day volatility, but have increased bid-
ask spreads and lowered market efﬁciency. Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang (2009) compare banned
stocks to a control group and ﬁnd that stocks subject to the temporary shorting ban in September
2008 suffered a severe reduction in spreads, price impacts, and intra-day volatility.
Most of these papers however, rely on indirect measures of short-sale constraints or a very
restricted sample of lending data. For example, Kolasinski, Reed, and Ringgenberg (2008) use a
database from twelve securities lenders to estimate the lending supply schedule and ﬁnd that loan
fees are relatively stable when demand is low, but highly variable when demand is high. Given
that stock lending is mostly done over-the-counter, it has been unexplored by researchers because
of poor data availability, especially information on the lending supply of shares. An exception is
D’Avolio (2002), who describes in detail the market for borrowing and shows that institutional
ownership can be used as a proxy for short-sales constraints, as they are more likely to bind among
stockswithlowerownershipbyinstitutionalinvestors. WearealsocloseinspirittoCohen, Diether,
and Malloy (2007), who create a methodology to identify demand and supply shifts by observing
price-quantity pairs and their impact of future stock returns. Our access to a comprehensive mea-
sureof lendingsupplyallowsus to directlytest theimpact ofﬁrm characteristics on lendingsupply.
We advocate that this measure can be interpreted as a proxy for the cost of searching and, thus, as
a measure of short-sale constraints.
3The SEC announcement can be found at: http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-211.htm.
7II. Research Design
A. Data
We use a proprietary dataset of equity lending supply postings and loans from Data Explorers Ltd.,
which collects this information from a signiﬁcant number of the largest custodians and prime bro-
kers in the securities lending industry.4 The data comprise security-level information from January
2005 to June 2008, with weekly data between 2005 and 2006 and daily afterwards. As of June
2008, there are $2.4 trillion in stocks available to borrow, out of which $448 billion are actually
lent out. This corresponds to an utilization level (i.e., amount lent out divided by amount available
to borrow) of around 17%. Note that equity loans are not an explicit measure of short selling,
since stock loans might be used as part of tax-arbitrage strategies [see for example Christoffersen,
Geczy, and Musto (2006)].
The main dependent variables in our study are equity lending supply, loan amount, loan fee,
and contract type. Equity supplypostingscontain thedollarvalueof shares availableforborrowing
on a given day (or week if before January 2007). We deﬁne lending supply as supply relative to
a ﬁrm’s market capitalization. Similarly, loan quantity is the dollar value of shares on loan on a
given day relative to market capitalization. Loan fees are set in two different ways depending on
the type of collateral placed by the borrower. If borrowers use cash - the dominant form in the U.S.
- then the loan fee is deﬁned as the difference between the risk-free interest rate and the rebate
rate. The rebate rate is the portion of the interest rate on the collateral which the borrower receives
back. If instead the transaction uses other securities as collateral, like U.S. Treasuries, the fee
is directly negotiated between the borrower and the lender. The contract type variable examines
whether equity loan transactions are open-term or ﬁxed-term. Open-term loans are renegotiated
4The information is currently collected daily from 125 custodians and 32 prime brokers. Data Explorers estimate
that the data represent 85% of global equity lending. See Safﬁ and Sigurdsson (2008) for a detailed description of the
data.
8every day. Fixed-term ones have predeﬁned clauses and maturities. The overnight risk-free rate of
the collateral’s currency is used for open-term loans. The Fed Open rate is used for loans with cash
collateral denominated in U.S. dollars and the Euro Overnight Index average (EONIA) is used for
loans denominated in Euros. The risk-free rate proxy for other currencies is the overnight rate at
London Interbank market (LIBOR) and local money market rates for smaller currencies. Linear
interpolation of LIBOR rates is used for ﬁxed-term loans in accordance with conventions in the
securities lending industry.
From these individual transactions, we compute daily averages for each ﬁrm in the sample.
Since the ownership data is reported at a quarterly frequency, we then compute quarterly averages
of equity lending variables for each ﬁrm, only including days with loan fees between -5% and 20%
to reduce the impact of outliers. In some tests in which we use monthly abnormal returns, equity
lending averages are computed at a monthly frequency.
In Figure 2 we plot the total lending supply and total loaned shares in billions of dollars (right-
axis) and the average utilization (left-axis) in a given quarter. We can observe the large increase in
the equity lending market since 2005, both in terms of increased supply and loans. However, stock
utilization levels have remained constant throughout the sample.
[Insert Figure 2 HERE]
In Figure 3 we show lending supply and loaned shares as a fraction of market capitalization
(left-axis) and the average loan fee (right-axis). There is a large increase in database coverage
in 2005, which shows the importance of working with normalized variables for each quarter to
reduce biases dueto calendar effects. Annualized fees have been relativelystableand showthat, on
average, it is very cheap to borrow shares in the U.S.. The average fee in June 2008 is around 0.6%
a year, similar to the ﬁgures reported by D’Avolio (2002) and Kolasinski, Reed, and Ringgenberg
(2008).
9[Insert Figure 3 HERE]
The main explanatory variables in our study are measures of the structure of ownership held
by institutional investors. The ownership data come from the Thomson Reuters CDA/Spectrum
database on SEC 13F ﬁlings. Form 13F is ﬁled on a quarterly basis by institutional investment
managers who exercise investment discretion over accounts holding at least $100 Million in eligi-
ble equity securities. These managers report the total long positions in each eligible security, ag-
gregated across all accounts over which they exercise investment discretion.5 The data is available
until June 30th, 2008 for approximately 3,000 stocks. For each stock we calculate the ownership
by each institution and total institutional ownership, both as a percentage of market capitalization.
We also calculate our two main measures of ownership concentration: HHI is the concentration of
institutions’ holdings using the Hirschman-Herﬁndahl Index, normalized to be between zero and
one; and Breadth is the number of institutional investors from Chen, Hong, and Stein (2002).
We match ﬁrms in the equity lending database with those available on CRSP. The ﬁnal sample
has 34,367 ﬁrm-quarter observations with lending data available, averaging 10 quarterly observa-
tions out of the 3,598 unique ﬁrms. From CRSP data, we compute market capitalization, turnover
and share price, cumulative quarterly returns, the standard deviation of daily returns, cumulative
abnormal returns based on the Carhart (1997) four-factor model, and the market beta using the
CRSP value-weighted market index as the benchmark.6 We only use common shares with prices
larger than $1, further merging the data to Compustat and collecting data on sales, total assets,
book debt, book equity and total dividends.
5We thank Stewart Mayhew for detailed advice on 13F holdings.
6Betas and abnormalreturns are estimated based on daily data with at least 60 days of observationsfor a given ﬁrm
within a quarter.
10B. Descriptive Statistics
Table I presents descriptive statistics for the main variables used in this paper. The average ﬁrm in
our sample has 17.67% of its market capitalization available to lend. On average, 4.81% of its cap-
italization is on loan, with the shares costing 0.43% per year to be borrowed. In our sample, 8.77%
of ﬁrm-quarter observations are “on special”, i.e. have lending fees above 100 basis points. Aver-
age total institutional ownership is above 70%, with 176 institutions on average as shareholders of
the typical ﬁrm.
[Insert Table I HERE]
Given our focus on lending supply, in Table II we report the sample’s main characteristics
sorted by lending supply quintiles. From Panel A, we ﬁnd that the difference in lending supply
between the lowest and highest quintiles is about 25% of market capitalization. The utilization of
these shares (i.e. amount loaned out divided by lending supply) across quintiles is stable at around
20%. As expected, loan fees are decreasing in supply, with ﬁrms with low supply being about ﬁve
times more expensive to borrow (1.05% per year) than those in the highest lending supply quintile
(0.20% per year). These numbers are similar to those reported by D’Avolio (2002), albeit shares
in our database are slightly more expensive and lent more often, which reﬂects the growth in the
equity lending market in recent years and the fact that our data cover a much bigger number of
data providers. We also ﬁnd that ﬁrms with low supply tend to be smaller, have lower turnover
and, perhaps surprisingly, low market betas.
Examining institutional ownership variables in Panel B, we ﬁnd that total ownership grows
with lending supply, consistent with their use as a proxy for lending supply as in Nagel (2005). We
can also observe that the average size of institutional holdings decreases with lending supply, but
holdings by the largest institutional shareholder are stable at around 10%. Our two main measures
of concentration, HHI and Breadth also decrease and increase respectively with lending supply. In
11Panel C, we ﬁnd that ﬁrms with higher supply tend to be larger, have higher stock turnover and
analyst coverage, but lower arbitrage risk.
[Insert Table II HERE]
C. Hypotheses
We test four hypotheses on how the equity lending market is affected by the structure of institu-
tional ownership. The hypotheses all build upon and developthe main idea that lending supply will
be lowerand shortsale constraintsmorelikely to bindwhen institutionalownershipis concentrated
among fewer investors.
Hypothesis 1 Lending supply is decreasing in the concentration of institutional ownership.
Recent literature has shown that short selling is associated with higher price efﬁciency and
that it places downward pressure on stock prices [e.g. Asquith, Pathak, and Ritter (2004), Bris,
Goetzmann, and Zhu (2007), Boehme, Danielsen, and Sorescu (2006), Cohen, Diether, and Malloy
(2007) and Safﬁ and Sigurdsson (2008)]. Further, it has been argued that lending supply increases
with institutional ownership and subsequently that it leads to an increase in price efﬁciency. The
main ideabehind thesearguments is that large institutionalowners are passivein natureand willing
to lend stock that they hold [e.g. D’Avolio (2002) and Nagel (2005)].
On the contrary, where institutional ownership is more concentrated this may not necessarily
hold true. A more concentrated ownership structure, or a structure including larger single insti-
tutional investors, results in shareholders having greater inﬂuence in the equity lending market
vis-a-vis a highly dispersed ownership structure. Then, if shareholders prefer higher valuations,
and short sale constraints allow stocks to be overpriced, shareholders should act to impede short-
selling by limiting equity lending supply. Hypothesis 1 posits a negative relationship between
ownership concentration and equity lending supply.
12In addition to the negative impact of concentration on lending supply predicted above, concen-
tration should affect the strength of the relationship between lending supply and total institutional
ownership. For low levels of ownership concentration, we expect a larger impact of total insti-
tutional ownership, as investors are less capable of inﬂuencing share prices with their holdings
and therefore withhold relatively less shares. However, where concentration of ownership is high,
institutional investors’ supply is expected to have a greater inﬂuence on prices, and they are more
likely to withhold their shares from the equity lending market. For example, the average ownership
of the largest institutional shareholder in the lowest quintiles of total institutional ownership and
ownership concentration (measured by the Hirschman-Herﬁndahl index) is 5.6%, while for ﬁrms
on the highest total institutional ownership and ownership concentration quintiles it is equal to
26.1%.
Hypothesis 2 Shortsaleconstraintsareincreasingintheconcentrationofinstitutionalownership.
While the effect of ownership structure on lending supply may be signiﬁcant, there are eco-
nomic consequences only if it affects the price of borrowing stock. Short selling carries various
costs and risks, such as the expense and difﬁculty of shorting and the risk that the short position
will have to be involuntarily closed due to recall of the borrowed shares. If these impediments
prevent investors from shorting certain stocks, these stocks can be overpriced.
We examine the effects of institutional ownership structure on the following constraints. First,
we examine the loan fee for borrowing stock. Second, we test if fee volatility is higher in stocks
with more concentrated ownership. Higher fee volatility presents a higher risk to borrowing stock
because borrowers are less certain about future borrowing costs. Third, we ask whether insti-
tutional ownership structure affects the likelihood of a stock becoming “special” in the lending
supply market. Specialness is a commonly used term in lending markets that refers to stocks with
large loan fees (deﬁned here as loans with average annualized fees in a quarter above 100 bps). In
13our sample, about 10% of ﬁrms in a given quarter are classiﬁed as such. Fourth, we investigate
if institutional ownership structure affects recall risk through the type of lending contract. Lend-
ing agreements can be open ended or ﬁxed term. A ﬁxed term contract speciﬁes the term over
which the stock is lent, while an open ended contract can be terminated at any point in time. The
open ended contract involves much greater recall risk. Fifth, we examine if concentrated owner-
ship increases arbitrage risk. We measure arbitrage risk by computing the standard deviation of
the residuals based on the Carhart (1997) 4-factor model of returns. Firms with higher idiosyn-
cratic volatility present riskier opportunities to arbitrageurs, measuring the volatility of returns that
cannot be hedged [Wurgler and Zhuravskaya (2002)].
Hypothesis 3 Demand forborrowingstockis decreasing in theconcentrationof institutionalown-
ership.
Hypotheses 1 and 2 describe the effects of ownership structure on equity lending supply and
short sale constraints. At ﬁrst blush it is not clear why the structure of institutional ownership
should also be important for borrowing demand. If institutional owners make their holdings avail-
able to the equity lending market then this should only affect the supply of stock. Similarly, one
assumes that demand originates from investors external to the ﬁrm who have no role to play in
ownership structure. However, rational investors, and in particular potential arbitrageurs, will in-
ternalize the effects that inﬂuential institutional investors have on lending supply and short sale
constraints. Consequently they will be less willing to borrow stock because of higher limits to
arbitrage, and stocks with more concentrated ownership should have lower demand curves all else
equal.
Unfortunately, we do not observe the demand curve for borrowing stock. Instead, we em-
ploy the methodology used in Cohen, Diether, and Malloy (2007) to focus on shifts in demand.
If more concentrated ownership decreases the demand for borrowing stock, then the likelihood
14of an outward (inward) demand shift occurring should be decreasing (increasing) in ownership
concentration.
Hypothesis 4 The returns associated with an outward demand shift are decreasing in the concen-
tration of institutional ownership.
As documentedin Cohen, Diether, and Malloy (2007)an outward demand shiftresults in future
negative returns because more capital is betting that the price will decrease. Hypothesis 4 goes
further and states that because concentrated ownership results in higher short sale constraints, the
compensation must be greater for traders to increase their demand for borrowing when ownership
is closely held. Compensation for borrowing the stock is through future negative returns, and
therefore these need to be more negative where ownership is concentrated.
D. Estimation Techniques
Our main objectives are to evaluate the effects of ownership structure on equity lending character-
istics and how these characteristics are related to limitsof arbitrage and stock returns. Our universe
of stocks comprises ﬁrms for which both Thomson Financial reports institutional ownership and
Data Explorers collects equity lending data. Our baseline tests employ both estimation of quarterly
regressions, reporting the average coefﬁcients and their standard deviation (i.e. Fama-Macbeth),
and also panel data regressions using ﬁxed-effects to control for unobserved heterogeneity at the
ﬁrm level and calendar-time dummies for heterogeneity over time. The regression takes the form:
yit = αi+θt+β1IOi,t+β2IOCONCi,t+β2MCi,t+β4DP<5,i,t+β5TOi,t+β6BMi,t+β6MOMi,t+ǫi,t
(1)
where yit is theequity lendingmeasure, IOi,t denotes total institutionalownership, IOCONCi,t is
institutionalownership concentration, MCi,t is market capitalization, DP<5,i,t is a dummy variable
15equal to one if stock price is less than ﬁve dollars, TOi,t is a stock turnover, BMi,t is book-to-
market, and MOMi,t is momentum.
These controls have been used by D’Avolio (2002) and control for relationships previously
found in the literature. For example, ﬁrms with large market capitalization and turnover also tend
to have a high lending supply of shares and be less expensive to borrow.
III. Empirical Results
A. Lending Supply & Institutional Ownership Structure
The results in the left-most four columns of Table III indicate that lending supply is increasing in
total ownership and decreasing in the concentration of institutional ownership. We include two
measures of institutional ownership concentration. These are the Hirschman-Herﬁndahl index for
institutionalownership, HHI; and thenumberof institutionalinvestors, Breadth, from Chen, Hong,
and Stein (2002). All speciﬁcations indicate that even after controlling for size, book-to-market,
momentum, and small stock price effects, equity lending supply is increasing in total institutional
ownership and decreasing in ownership concentration (or equivalently increasing in Breadth).
Thecoefﬁcientofownershipconcentrationonequitylendingsupplyisnegativeandstatistically
signiﬁcant, and around a third the magnitude of the total ownership effect in the Fama-Macbeth
speciﬁcations. For example, in the Fama-Macbeth regression we ﬁnd that the coefﬁcient on HHI is
-0.189, while the coefﬁcient on total ownership is 0.616. Using normalized variables throughout,
the coefﬁcients imply that a one standard deviation increase in ownership concentration decreases
lending supply by 2.1%, and a one standard deviation increase in total ownership increases lending
supply by 7.0%. Similarly, equity lending supply is and increasing in Breadth. For Breadth,
concentration is at least as important as total ownership: a one standard deviation increase in
concentration combined with a one standard deviation increase in total ownership decreases equity
16lending supply.
[Insert Table III HERE]
Hypothesis 1 also posits that concentration will have an impact on the relationship between
lending supply and total institutional holdings itself. For low levels of concentration, institutional
investors’ marginal impact on the lending market is likely smaller and they would have less in-
centives to withhold their shares from being lent. However, as concentration increases, investors
are less likely to lend their shares. To capture this we introduce Total*QHHI and Total*QBreadth,
which are constructed by multiplying total ownership by the ﬁrm’s ownership concentration HHI
and Breadth quintilesrespectively. If concentration weakens theeffect of total ownershipon equity
lending supply then the coefﬁcient on Total*QHHI (Total*QBreadth should be negative (positive).
The results in left-most four columns of Table III conﬁrm this. Rows 1 to 3 show that the coefﬁ-
cients on total ownership, HHI and Total*QHHI are positive, negative, and negative respectively.
Using estimates from the Fama-Macbeth regression in Column 6, for an otherwise equivalent ﬁrm,
moving from the lowest to highest HHI quintile reduces the effects of total ownership to 0.573, a
reduction of 0.324, in addition to the coefﬁcient of -0.208 on HHI alone. The results are similar
for Breadth, which are presented in Columns 7-8.
B. Short Sale Constraints & Institutional Ownership Structure
As described in the hypothesis development, an important issue in analyzing the effects of owner-
ship on equity lending is measuring to what extent ownership affects short sale constraints. While
lending supply effects may be large, the importance may be moot if they do not have consequences
for the pricing of borrowing stock, which in turn constrain short sales. We investigate the relation-
ship between institutional ownership structure and short sale constraints by focusing on the cost of
17borrowing stock, loan fee volatility, the likelihood of a stock being on special, contract term, and
arbitrage risk. All ﬁve characteristics may constrain short sales.
To explore the effects of ownership on short sale constraints we use the two measures of con-
centration in ﬁxed effects and Fama-Macbeth regressions. First, in Table IV we examine loan fees
and fee volatility. Panel A presents evidence that loan fees are higher where institutional owner-
ship is more concentrated. If lower equity lending supply - as determined by ownership structure
- has consequences for loan fees then we expect that total institutional ownership should have a
negativeor neutral affect on loan fees, and ownership concentration should decrease loan fees. For
the most part we ﬁnd this to be true. All speciﬁcations conﬁrm a negative relationship between
ownership concentration and lending fees, while both HHI and Breadth Fama-Macbeth speciﬁca-
tions obtain a negative coefﬁcient on total ownership. Focusing on the Fama-Macbeth regressions
for HHI shows that the effects of total ownership and ownership concentration are similar in size,
while for Breadth the effects of concentration are larger. The coefﬁcient on Total is -0.211 and
for HHI the coefﬁcient is 0.171, both statistically signiﬁcant. These equate to a decrease of 21bps
and an increase of 17bps in lending fee for a one standard deviation increase in total ownership
and ownership respectively. Both compared to a mean lending fee of 49bps. The evidence on loan
fees supports Hypothesis 2: ownership concentration impedes short selling by increasing the cost
of borrowing stock.
[Insert Table IV HERE]
Panel B examinesloan fee volatility. Higherloan fee volatilitycreates a short sale constraint, or
limit to arbitrage, because arbitrageurs may be exposed to a larger fee in the future where contract
characteristics are not ﬁxed. Loan fee volatility is calculated as the daily cross-sectional ﬁrm-level
volatility in loan fee, averaged over each quarter. The mean (median) loan fee volatility is 29bps
(12bps) with a standard deviation of 50bps, and is zero for a quarter of ﬁrm year observations.
18Generally, the loan fee is persistent, with an AR(1) coefﬁcient of 0.8. The stocks with zero loan
fee volatility indicates fee insensitivity to changes in demand, perhaps from low utilization or high
slack supply. The results in Panel B offer further support for Hypothesis 2. All ownership concen-
tration coefﬁcients indicate that loan fees increase with ownership concentration. The economic
impact on limits to arbitrage is large: a one standard deviation increase in HHI (column two) is
associated with an increase in volatility of +0.126 standard deviations in loan fee volatility, or
approximately 5bps.
In Table V we switch attention to the probability that a stock is “on special” or borrowed
through a ﬁxed term contract. Panel A of Table V presents results from a logit model where the de-
pendent variable is equal to one if the stock is “on special” and zero otherwise. The left hand panel
includes the logit speciﬁcation coefﬁcients while the right hand panel presents the marginal effects
of a change around the man. For brevity only the variables of interest are presented. The results
overwhelmingly support our hypothesis: the probability of a stock being “on special” increases
with ownership concentration and decreases with total ownership. The marginal effects analysis
reveals that a one standard deviation increase in HHI increases the probability of a stock being “on
special” by 1.4%, and total ownership decreases the probability by around 3.4%, or approximately
one-third of the sample average of 8.77%. Similarly, the number of institutional investors has a
negative and signiﬁcant effect on the probability of a stock being on special.
In Panel B we examine the effects of ownership on contract type. A loan contract may be
open-term, in which case the loan has a maturity of one day and is renewed each trading day, or for
a ﬁxed-term maturity. For open-term loans, the lender may recall the loan at the end of each day.
The option to recall allows the lender to maintain the control rights of the share while receiving
a borrowing fee. For a borrower, an open-ended contract signiﬁcantly increases recall risk. Thus,
if concentrated ownership increases limits to arbitrage through higher recall risk then we should
expect the probability of ﬁxed-term loans to be signiﬁcantly lower where concentration is higher.
19We calculate loan-term at the ﬁrm-level as the equally weighted term across all loans for the ﬁrm
on a given day, and then average this over the quarter of interest. A contract term of one day is
taken to be an open-term contract. In our sample, approximately forty percent of all loan contracts
are ﬁxed-term contracts and the seventy-ﬁfth percentile term is 1.64 days.
In Panel B of Table V we estimate logit regressions where the dependent variable is equal to
oneifthe contract is ﬁxed-termand zero if thecontract is open-term. Theresultsin Panel B support
Hypothesis 2 but the magnitude of the marginal effects are smaller than for the results for a stock
being “on special”. A one standard deviation increase in total ownership increases the probability
of the loan term being ﬁxed by approximately 6.4%, while a one standard deviation increase in
concentration decreases the probability of the loan term being ﬁxed by approximately 1.8%.
[Insert Table V HERE]
In our ﬁnal piece of analysis on short sale constraints we investigate the effect of ownership
on arbitrage risk. Arbitrage risk is calculated using the Wurgler and Zhuravskaya (2002) idiosyn-
cratic risk variable - measured as the standard deviation of stock returns’ residuals estimated with
the Carhart (1997) 4-factor model. For our sample, the average arbitrage risk is 2.11%. Idiosyn-
cratic risk poses a limit to arbitrage that deters short-selling simply because a large amount of the
stocks’ volatility cannot be hedged, as argued by Shleifer and Vishny (1997). Table VI presents
the results from Fama-Macbeth regressions of arbitrage risk on ownership characteristics and con-
trol variables. We include equity lending supply and lending fee as independent variables in the
regressions to control for any effects that short selling might have on idiosyncratic risk. In all
regressions we ﬁnd that higher equity lending supply is associated with less idiosyncratic risk. In
addition, the effect of ownership structure on idiosyncratic risk is small but statistically signiﬁcant.
For example, in Column 1 a one standard deviation increase in total ownership decreases arbitrage
risk by 5bps and a one standard deviation decrease in HHI increases arbitrage risk by 6bps (note
20that the standard deviation of arbitrage risk is equal to 1.22%).
[Insert Table VI HERE]
In summary, limits to arbitrage are higher for stocks with more concentrated ownership struc-
tures. This result arises because tighter held ownership squeezes equity lending supply, which in
turn increases thecost ofborrowingstock -in bothtoday’sprices and theuncertaintyin tomorrow’s
prices - and increases recall risk. Recall risk may be affected because where ownership is tighter
or owners are more inﬂuential there is a much larger beneﬁt from recalling stock around important
proxy votes. Therefore non-marginal investors would be unwilling to lend equity on a ﬁxed term
basis. Lastly, we show that concentrated ownership is associated with an additional limit to arbi-
trage outside of the equity lending supply channel. Stocks with concentrated ownership exhibit
higher arbitrage risk, which in the spirit of Shleifer and Vishny (1997) deters arbitrage and leads
to persistent mis-pricing.
C. The Demand for Borrowing Stock & Institutional Ownership Structure
We now turn attention to the demand for borrowing stock. Thus far we have shown that institu-
tional ownership structure affects the level of equity lending supply provided by the same owners.
However, as discussed in Section II.C, whenever investors and potential arbitrageurs anticipate in-
stitutionalinvestorbehavioronthesupplysidetheyshouldmodifytheirownbehavior. Speciﬁcally,
arbitrageurs should internalize the higher short sale constraints and limits to arbitrage associated
with more concentrated ownership into their demand function. Subsequently there may be lower
demand for shorting stocks where institutional ownership is inﬂuential or more concentrated. Hy-
pothesis 3 capture this. Demand for borrowing stock should be increasing in total ownership -
because this reduces short sale constraints - and decreasing in ownership concentration - because
this increases short sale constraints.
21To investigate the effects of ownership structure on demand we employ the methodology pro-
posed by Cohen, Diether, and Malloy (2007). The identiﬁcation strategy consists of constructing
price-quantity “pairs” from the equity lending market to isolate clear shifts in supply and demand.
For example, an increase in the loan fee (i.e., price) coupled with an increase in the percentage of
shares on loan (i.e., quantity) corresponds to an increase in shorting demand, as would be the case
for any increase in price coupled with an increase in quantity. This strategy does not identify an
exclusive outward demand shift. Instead, a shift of price and quantity into this quadrant implies
that at least an outward demand shift must have occurred. We classify movements in loan prices
and quantities by placing stocks into one of four quadrants at each point in time, but restrict atten-
tion to only demand shifts. Stocks that have experienced at least an outward demand shift (DOUT)
have seen both their loan fees and their loan amounts rise; and stocks that experienced at least an
inward demand shift (DIN) have seen both their loan fee and loan quantity fall. Cohen, Diether,
and Malloy (2007) also examine stocks that have experienced an outward supply shift (SOUT) and
inward supply shift (SIN), but only ﬁnd a minor role played by shifts in supply in determining
stock returns.
Each of the shifts has an economic interpretation. DOUT captures the case in which both the
cost of shorting (i.e., loan fee) and the amount that investors are willing to short at this higher cost
increase. Effectively, more capital is betting that the price will decrease, despite the higher explicit
cost of betting. DIN captures the case in which both shorting costs and the amount that investors
borrow at this lower price decrease.
Using this strategy, we ﬁnd that outward demand shifts comprise 39% of price-quantity “pairs”
shifts, inward demand shifts contribute 15%, outward supply shifts contribute 32%, and inward
supply shifts contribute 13%. Combined, demand and supply shifts occur in 99% of ﬁrm-quarter
observations. This is much greater than the aggregate shifts found by Cohen, Diether, and Malloy
(2007), and likelydue to the increased coveragein our dataset. Demand and supplyshifts are likely
22to be correlated cross-sectionally because arbitrageurs’ expectations of stock prices will reﬂect in
part expectations of the market. To control for this, at each time period we ﬁrst normalize shifts in
the loan fee and quantity borrowed so that each has a mean of zero and standard deviation of one.
We then use these to identify demand and supply shifts using normalized price-quantity “pairs”
shifts. After normalization, 23% of price-quantity “pairs” are outward demand shifts, 36% are
inward demand shifts, outward supply shifts comprise 22%, and inward supply shifts 19%.
To formally test Hypothesis 3 we estimate separate monthly logit regressions for normalized
DOUT and DIN on lagged levels in ownership structure and market characteristics.
We compute demand shifts and market characteristics for each month, using monthly lags for
lending supply and CRSP variables. However, we observe ownership variables at the quarterly
frequency only and employ levels in the prior quarters as lagged explanatory variables.
The results are presented in Columns 1 and 2 of Table VII. For all shifts we run tests using
all four concentration measures, but only show results for HHI. Focussing on DOUT, an outward
demand shift is more likely if there is higher total ownership, or less concentrated ownership.
The left hand panel presents the logit coefﬁcients and the right hand panel presents the marginal
coefﬁcients. A one standard deviation increase in total ownership increases DOUT by 0.7% and a
one standard deviation increase in ownership concentration decreases DOUT by 1.0%. Focussing
on DIN, we ﬁnd the opposite: A one standard deviation increase in total ownership decreases
DIN by 1.3% and a on standard deviation increase in ownership concentration increases DOUT by
0.8%.
The results are consistent with short sale constraints impeding demand for borrowing stock. In
isolation higher total ownership increases equity lending supply and lowers short sale constraints.
Consider an arbitrageur deciding to execute a trade of shares in a ﬁrm with high dispersed institu-
tional ownership. Potential arbitrageurs face lower fees and limits to arbitrage, which result in a
higher proportion of potential trades being proﬁtable and a higher demand to borrow equity. Sim-
23ilarly, consider a ﬁrm with very high concentrated ownership. Ownership concentration restricts
equity lending supply and raises short sale constraints. The same arbitrageur will face higher fees
and limits to arbitrage, a lower proportion of potential trades will be proﬁtable, and the demand to
borrow equity will be lower.
[Insert Table VII HERE]
An examination of the market characteristics reveals that inward demand shifts are more likely
for large ﬁrms; higher turnover predicts inward demands shifts; outward demand shifts are more
likely for growth (value) stocks; and that short-term momentum predicts outward demand shifts
while long-term momentum predicts inward demand shifts.
In columns 3 and 4, we also present results for logit regressions of demand shifts on lagged
dependent variables for the ﬁrst month of each quarter only. Using the ﬁrst month of the quarter
only is motivated by the investment horizon of arbitrageurs and quarterly frequency of ownership
variables. Similar to Cohen, Diether, and Malloy (2007), we ﬁnd that the mean (median) holding
period for borrowing stock is 38 (3) days, based on only ﬁxed term borrowing contracts. Hence,
including all monthly observations in Panel A involves regressing demand shifts on “stale” owner-
ship characteristics, which might bias results in favor of strengthening the signiﬁcance of monthly
frequency variables relative to quarterly-based ones. Regressions for the ﬁrst month of the quar-
ter only employs one-month lags throughout, reducing the sample size by a third. Examining
the marginal effects in the right hand panel shows that using more recent observations leads to
stronger results. For DOUT a one standard deviation increase in total ownership increases DOUT
by 3.3% and a one standard deviation decreases in ownership concentration decreases DOUT by
1.2%. Only the effect of HHI on DIN is weaker.
An alternative to Hypothesis 3 is that ownership and demand shifts are related because institu-
tional owners and arbitrageurs both receive information on future performance, and agree on the
24interpretation. Then, positivenews results in both institutionalownership increasing and an inward
demand shift. Similarly negative news should lead to a decrease in institutional ownership and an
outward demand shift. Hence, DOUT (DIN) would be negatively (positively)associated with total
ownership and likely positively (negatively) associated with ownership concentration. This pre-
diction is robust to institutional investors and arbitrageurs forming beliefs on identical information
or updating beliefs based on each other’s actions. This alternative hypothesis based on investor
sentiment has the exact opposite predictions to the limits to arbitrage based story we formulate in
Hypothesis 3, being rejected by our ﬁndings.
D. Demand shifts, Returns & Institutional Ownership Structure
Motivated by Cohen, Diether, and Malloy (2007), who show that DOUT shifts predict negative
abnormal returns, Hypothesis 4 examines the returns where there is an outward demand shift and
concentrated ownership. Hypothesis 4 is simply a result of the same mechanism described in
Hypothesis3. If concentrated supplyincreases limitstoarbitragethen eitherdemandforborrowing
stock will decrease - because shorting stock is no longer proﬁtable - or the gains to borrowing
stock must be higher to compensate arbitrageurs. Cross-sectionally, we should observe that DOUT
(DIN) is lower (higher) and abnormal returns are higher for stocks with concentrated ownership.
Similarly, we should observe that DOUT (DIN) is higher (lower) and abnormal returns are lower
for stocks with higher total ownership.
We measure abnormal returns as the difference in the monthly stock return to those from a
characteristics-matched benchmark portfolio sorted on market capitalization, book-to-market and
momentum following Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997). Then we estimate regres-
sionsusingmonthlyabnormal returns, includingcalendar monthdummies,and correct standarder-
rors using robust standard errors clustered at the ﬁrm-level. We employ lagged ownership structure
25-relatingtothelevelattheendofthepreviousquarter, laggedcontrolvariables, andcontemporane-
ous demand shifts. The choice of lagged ownership characteristics and contemporaneous demand
shifts is motivated by estimating the impact of observed ownership structure on arbitrageurs’ de-
mand decisions. Given, the short investmenthorizon of equity borrowers impliesthat return effects
should be observed in days or weeks, rather than months. Consequently, using future monthly re-
turns will overshootthe reaction window. Similarly, we includeonly the ﬁrst month in each quarter
to capture the most recent ownership observations. The dependent variables of interest are the in-
teraction terms of total ownership and ownership concentration with demand shifts. We aggregate
DIN and DOUT into a single DSHIFT variable, which is calculated as DOUT-DIN. DSHIFT is
equal to one (minus one) if there is an outward (inward) demand shift and zero otherwise. We then
interact DSHIFT with ownership structure quintiles.
We presenttheresultsinTableVIII. In Column1 wereplicatetheresult thatdemandshiftscon-
veynegativeinformationforreturns, documentedbyCohen, Diether, and Malloy(2007). Thecoef-
ﬁcient on DSHIFT of -1.780 implies that a one standard deviation increase (decrease) in DSHIFT
decreases (increases) abnormal returns by 1.78% per month (or an annualized 21.36%). We in-
terpret a shift from no shift to an outward or inward demand shift as being equivalent to a 1.36
standard deviations movement, based on the inverse of the standard deviation of DSHIFT equal to
0.734. Then, our ﬁndings suggest that an outward demand shift predicts an annualized abnormal
return of 29%.
[Insert Table VIII HERE]
In Column 2 we introduce DSHIFT*QHHI, the interaction between demand shifts and own-
ership concentration, and the level in ownership concentration. We employ quintiles simply for
ease of interpretation. Hypothesis 4 posits that for stocks with concentrated ownership there is a
negative return in addition to the negative return associated with DSHIFT. Hence, Hypothesis 4
26predicts that the coefﬁcient on DSHIFT*QHHI should be negative and signiﬁcant. We ﬁnd pre-
cisely this. The coefﬁcient of -0.187 on DSHIFT*QHHI implies that, for an outward demand shift,
thenegativeabnormalreturn from being in quintileﬁve compared with quintileonein HHI is equal
to 8.98% per year (=0.187*(5-1)*12), in addition to a negative annualized return of 15.04% for an
outward demand shift alone.
We include interactions of demand shifts with both total ownership and ownership concentra-
tion in Column 3. We ﬁnd that the negative return associated with an outward demand shift is
signiﬁcantly lower at 6.87% per year, with the remaining difference varying with total ownership
and concentration. Thecoefﬁcient of-0.161 on totalownershipimpliesthat for an outward demand
shift, the additional negative abnormal return from being in quintile ﬁve compared with quintile
one in total ownership is equal to 7.73% per year. Similarly, ownership concentration contributes
an additional negative abnormal return of 12.4% per year.
Combined, the signiﬁcance of the interaction terms reveal that total ownership enables outward
demand shifts - and negative abnormal returns - through increasing available equity supply, and
that ownership concentration increases negative abnormal returns for outward demand shifts as
compensation for higher limits to arbitrage. Further, the results show that ownership structure
effects explain almost three-quarters of the negative abnormal return predicted by demand shifts.
In summary, Sections C and D support Hypotheses 3 and 4. The supply side constraints imposed
by concentrated ownership structure impact demand decisions. Arbitrageurs face higher risks to
arbitrage and decrease borrowing demand or demand higher returns in compensation.
27IV. Robustness
A. Alternative Measures of Ownership Structure
Our two measures of ownership concentration, HHI and Breadth, both analyze the concentration
of institutional ownership using all owners. Both these measures will be smaller for larger more
liquid stocks that have more diffuse ownership. While we control for both size and liquidity to be
sure that our measure of concentration is not collecting these effects we check that our results our
robust to two alternate measures of concentration. We introduce Top1 and HS1, which measure he
percentage held by the largest shareholder, and the ratio of the largest institutional holding to total
institutional holdings. Both these measures examine concentration using the single largest owner
and abstract from the number of institutional owners.7
Tables and X present robustness results using Top1 and HS1 respectively. In both tables, Panel
A repeats the Fama-Macbeth estimations for lending supply, lending fee, fee volatility, and arbi-
trage risk presented in Tables III, IV, and VI. Similarly, Panel B repeats the logit estimations for
specialness and loan terms presented in Table V. For both Top1 and HS1, we ﬁnd overwhelming
evidence in support of our earlier results.
[Insert Table IX HERE]
Additionally, where Top1 and HS1 are high, the largest institutional investor is more likely to
able to hold court with the ﬁrm’s management. Then, Top1 and HS1 may measure the level of
inﬂuence that the largest institutional investor has on management, which in itself may determine
whether an institutional owner is willing to lend shares. The decision to lobby or lend shares is
similar to the decision to lobby or walk, which has been studied by Admati and Pﬂeiderer (2009),
Edmans (2009) and Edmans and Manso (2009). Prior literature has used measures of investor
7In unreported results we also the top three- and ﬁve-largest institutional shareholders, with similar results.
28inﬂuence to show that ﬁrms with more inﬂuential institutional investors have higher CEO pay
for performance and lower compensation [Hartzell and Starks, (2003)]. Our results suggest that
concentrated and inﬂuential ownership structures both reduce equity lending.
[Insert Table X HERE]
B. GMM Estimation
Hankins and Flannery (2008) and Petersen (2009) show how empirical work in ﬁnance, which
usually involves large number of ﬁrms (large N) observed for small periods of time (small T),
needs to carefully address possible biases in estimation due to the correlation between unobserved
heterogeneity and predetermined regressors.8
In our case, the high persistence of lending supply (ﬁrst-order serial correlation is 0.96 and
second-order is 0.90) might induce biases in ownership coefﬁcients if we omit lagged supply as
explanatory variables. We address this possibility with Blundell and Bond (1998)’s dynamic panel
regressions.
The dynamic model we consider has i = 1,...,N ﬁrms and t = 1,...,Ti quarterly observa-




αjyi,t−j + xi,tβ + νi + ǫi,t (2)
where xi,t denotes our k independent variables and time dummies, α1,...,αp,β is the vector of
p + k parameters to be estimated, νi are the ﬁrm-level ﬁxed effects, and ǫi,t are i.i.d shocks.
The Blundell and Bond (1998) GMM estimator works by proposing a system of moment con-
ditions in which lagged differences are used as instruments to the level equation and lagged levels
8There is a large body of research on panel-data estimation in the economics literature to address these biases, like
Nickell (1981), Anderson and Hsiao (1982), Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and
Bond (1998).
29as instruments for the equation in differences. Since in panel models the removal of ﬁrm-level het-
erogeneity usually involves calculation of ﬁrst differences, the transformed errors have a structure
that is more complex than standard idiosyncratic shocks. In these equations, predetermined and
endogenous variables in levels are instrumented with suitable lags of their own ﬁrst differences.
Our results ﬁnd large differences in estimated parameters due to the omission of lags in dependent
variables.
[Insert Table XI HERE]
Table reports estimates corresponding to the Blundell and Bond (1998) estimator. We repeat
tests of ownership structure on lending supple, lending fee, and fee volatility for both HHI and
Breadth. Ourresultscontinuetoobtain. Onceagain weﬁnd thatlendingsupplyincreases withtotal
ownership and decreases with ownership structure, while both the lending fee and fee volatility
decrease with total ownership and increase with ownership structure.
C. Causality of Ownership Structure and Demand Shifts
Hypotheses 3 and 4 and the results in Tables and imply a causal link between ownership structure
and demand shifts. In Table XII we conﬁrm this and rule out reverse causality. We regress nor-
malized ownership characteristics (that are explanatory variables in Table ) on lagged normalized
demand shifts, normalized lending supply and stock characteristics using only observations. If
ownership structure inﬂuences demand - rather than demand inﬂuences ownership structure - then
demand and supply shifts should have no signiﬁcance in determining future changes in ownership
structure. In the main, the causal logit regression results show that ownership structure causally
effects demand for borrowing stock. In Column 1 we can observe that neither lagged DOUT nor
lagged DIN coefﬁcients are statistically signiﬁcant to explain total ownership. In Column 2, using
30HHI as a measure of concentration, we ﬁnd no relationship with lagged DOUT and a positive but
weak (signiﬁcant only at the 10% level) coefﬁcient for lagged DIN.
[Insert Table XII HERE]
V. Conclusion
Arbitrageurs often use short selling as part of their trading strategies, borrowing securities they
do not own to speculate on price decreases. Short selling entails various costs and risks, such as
locating shares to borrow, loan fees, and the risk that the short position is involuntarily closed due
to recall of the borrowed shares. We argue that investors who own large holdings or contribute
to a more concentrated ownership structure are less willing to lend shares, affecting arbitrageurs’
ability to engage in short selling.
The main objective of this paper is to examine how the composition of institutional ownership
affects the market for borrowing stock. Using a proprietary data set with information on equity
lending supply, loan transactions and loan fees we show that ownership structure is an important
determinant of equity lending supply and short sale constraints. More speciﬁcally, we ﬁnd that
ﬁrms with low total ownership and high concentration of ownership tend to have smaller lending
supply, higher loan fees, loan fees’ volatility, and arbitrage risk. For example, ﬁrms in the low-
ownership high-concentration quintile have just 3.8% of their market capitalization available to
borrow, against 26.9% for ﬁrms in the high-ownership low-concentration quintile.
We use several measures of ownership concentration and statistical methods to show that insti-
tutionalownershipconcentrationnegativelyimpactsstocklendingsupply,aftercontrollingfortotal
institutionalownership. In addition, we examine the effect that ownership concentration has on the
relationship between ownership levels and lending supply. We ﬁnd that concentration weakens the
impact of total ownership on lending supply, especially for those with high institutional owner-
31ship. For ﬁrms with the most concentrated ownership structure, total ownership is insigniﬁcant in
explaining lending supply. We also examine measures of short sale constraints and ﬁnd that to-
tal ownership relieves constraints while ownership concentration increases the costs of borrowing
equity and raises limits to arbitrage.
Finally, we examine demand for borrowing stock and the impact of changes on stock returns.
We hypothesize that arbitrageurs internalize the effects of ownership on lending supply and short
sale constraints, updating their own demand curves. Arbitrageurs must be compensated for the
higher risk associated with short selling stocks with concentrated ownership. We identify de-
mand shifts using price-quantity pairs based on the methodology proposed by Cohen, Diether,
and Malloy (2007) and ﬁnd that total ownership increases (decreases) and concentration decreases
(increases) the likelihood of an outward (inward) demand shift. When examining the impact of
these shifts on stock returns we ﬁnd that where an outward demand shift occurs, the stock returns
are even more negative for ﬁrms with concentrated ownership, compensating arbitrageurs for the
higher limits to arbitrage and borrowing costs. These results suggest a link between the limits
to arbitrage and ownership structure, which to the best of our knowledge has not been explored
previously.
During the ﬁnancial crisis in 2008, regulators imposedshort selling restrictionsin several coun-
tries, especially following the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers.9 Short selling regulation in the
United States is currently under review by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and
a better understanding of how equity lending markets are affected by the ownership structure is
important for policy makers.10 The current opaqueness found in equity lending markets can and
should be addressed by regulators and more disclosure on equity lenders of a given stock and the
costs associated with borrowing shares would provide investors with a better understanding of the
9Please refer to http://www.dataexplorers.com/rsmfor a comprehensive list of current short sale restrictions.
10For the latest information on the SEC’s discussion: http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/shortsales.shtml
32risks involved in short selling.
In termsoffutureresearch, thereareseveraldirectionsthatcan befollowed. Forexample, study
how institutional ownership changes around mergers affect equity lending markets. The exchange
ofstockbetweenshareholderswithdifferentcharacteristics, intermsofinvestmenthorizon, trading
strategies and size of the stake, might trigger supply and demand shocks, affecting pricing in the
lending market. The price effects associated with short selling could be another channel by which
changes in corporate governance mechanisms affect stock prices.
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37Figure 1. Lending Supply, Loan Fees and Arbitrage Risk: Total Ownership vs. Concentration
Quintiles
The ﬁgure displays quarterly lending supply, loan fees and arbitrage risk of U.S. ﬁrms from Jan-
uary 2005 to June 2008 sorted on total institutional ownership quintiles and then, within each quin-
tile, further sorted on ownership concentration quintiles. Concentration is measured by the Hirschman-
Herﬁndahl index of institutional ownership. Lending Supply is the quarterly average fraction of the
ﬁrm available to lend, Loan Fee is the value-weighted average equity loan fee (% p.a.), and Arbitrage


































































































































































































































































Utilization Supply ($ billions) On Loan ($ billions)
The ﬁgure shows the total lending supply, total shares on loan and the average utilization (shares on loan
divided by lending supply) for each quarter between March 2005 and June 2008.















































































































































Loan Fee (%) Supply (% mc) On Loan (%mc)
The ﬁgure shows average lending supply and the average shares on loan as a fraction of ﬁrm capitalization,
and average value-weighted annualized loan fee for each quarter between March 2005 and June 2008.
39Table I
Descriptive Statics
The table shows quarterly descriptive statistics from January 2005 to June 2008 of the main variables used
in the paper. Equity lending data is provided by Data Explorers, stock price are from CRSP, ownership
data from SEC’s 13F holdings, and accounting data from Compustat. Obs is the number of ﬁrm-quarter
observations available, Supply is the quarterly average fraction of the ﬁrm available to lend, On Loan is
the average fraction effectively lent out, Fee(VW) is the value-weighted average loan fee, Specialness is a
dummy variable equal to one if the loan fee is above 100bps (summary statistics describe sample metrics),
Util. is On Loan divided by Supply, Price is the quarterly CRSP price average, Size is ﬁrm size in billions,
 (Ret) is the average monthly return, σ(Ret) is the standard deviation of returns, Turnover is average daily
turnover (x100), Arb. Risk is the idiosyncratic risk of daily returns from a regression based on the Carhart
(1997) 4-factor model, βmkt is the market beta from the same regression, and B/M is the book-to-market
ratio. Ownership statistics are computed from institutional investors ﬁlling 13-f reports. Total is the total
institutional ownership, HHI is concentration of ownership measured by the Hirschman-Herﬁndahl index,
Mean is the average size of holdings, Top1 is the percentage held by the largest shareholder, HS1 measures
investors’ inﬂuence as in Hartzell and Starks (2003). Breadth is the number of institutional investors as in
Chen, Hong, and Stein (2002). Net Sales and Total Assets are measured in millions and Leverage is book
debt divided by the sum of book debt and market capitalization.
Variable Obs Mean Median St.Dev Min Max
Supply 34,367 17.67% 16.64% 11.30% 0.46% 46.47%
On Loan 34,366 4.81% 2.44% 5.91% 0.01% 28.41%
Fee (VW) 34,367 0.43% 0.13% 0.99% -0.01% 6.44%
Specialness 34,367 8.77% 0.00% 28.29% 0.00% 100%
Utilization 34,367 20.57% 14.00% 19.57% 0.20% 82.91%
Price 34,367 63.05 23.79 1,919 0.31 135,459
Size (bi) 34,367 6.96 6.81 1.64 1.73 12.65
 (Ret) 34,367 0.66% 0.20% 20.97% -88.07% 338%
σ(Ret) 34,367 19.32% 17.56% 9.96% 1.13% 314%
Arb. Risk 34,367 2.11% 1.86% 1.22% 0.14% 38.49%
Turnover 34,367 1.02% 0.79% 0.93% 0.01% 31.09%
βmkt 34,367 1.00 1.00 0.65 -0.87 2.76
B/M 34,353 0.48 0.42 0.32 0.01 1.79
Total 34,367 70.28% 74.87% 23.58% 0.00% 100%
HHI 34,367 7.00% 5.09% 6.45% 1.33% 100%
Mean 34,367 0.68% 0.60% 0.46% 0.00% 8.96%
Stdev 34,367 1.48% 1.34% 0.86% 0.00% 17.92%
Top1 34,367 10.20% 9.37% 5.58% 0.00% 100%
HS1 34,367 15.89% 13.48% 9.36% 3.57% 100%
Breadth 34,367 176 124 179 1 1,603
Sales 34,328 949 168 2,988 -4,790 80,962
Assets 34,367 10,264 993 72,921 1 2,358,266
Leverage 32,810 30.61% 27.94% 26.33% 0.00% 96.21%
40Table II
Descriptive Statics - Lending Supply Quintiles
The table shows quarterly descriptive statistics of U.S. ﬁrms from January 2005 to June 2008 sorted by
equity lending supply quintiles. Equity lending data are supplied by Data Explorers Ltd., price data by
CRSP, ownership data from SEC’s 13F holdings, analyst data from IBES, and accounting information by
Compustat. Panel A displays equity lending market statistics: ObsSupply is the number of ﬁrm-quarter
observations for which lending supply data is available, Supply is the quarterly average fraction of market
capitalization available to lend, On Loan is the average fraction effectively lent out, Specialness is a dummy
variable equal to one if the loan fee is above 100bps, Util. is On Loan divided by Supply and Fee(VW) is
the value-weighted average loan fee. Panel B reports institutional ownership characteristics. Total is total
institutional ownership, Mean is the average size of holdings, StDev is the standard deviation, Top1 and
Top3 are the percentages held by the largest and the three-largest shareholders, HHI is concentration of
ownership measured by the Hirschman-Herﬁndahl index, HS1 measures investors’ inﬂuence as in Hartzell
and Starks (2003) and Breadth is the number of institutional investors as in Chen, Hong, and Stein (2002).
Panel C reports summary statistics from Compustat and IBES: Price is the quarterly CRSP price average,
Size is ﬁrm size in billions,  (Ret) is the average monthly return, σ(Ret) is the standard deviation of returns,
Arb. Risk is the idiosyncratic risk of daily returns based on the Carhart (1997) 4-factor model, βmkt is the
market index beta from the Carhart (1997) 4 factor model, Assets is total assets, Lever. is the book debt
divided by the sum of book debt and market capitalization, and Analysts reports analyst coverage.
Panel A: Equity Lending
Quintile ObsSupply Supply On Loan Specialness Util. Fee(VW)
1 6,879 5.9% 2.1% 27.2% 25.1% 1.05%
2 6,873 13.3% 4.1% 8.0% 21.9% 0.40%
3 6,874 18.0% 4.4% 3.6% 17.8% 0.25%
4 6,873 22.2% 5.4% 2.9% 17.7% 0.22%
5 6,868 29.0% 8.0% 2.2% 20.3% 0.20%
Overall 34,367 17.7% 4.8% 8.8% 20.6% 0.43%
Panel B: Institutional Ownership
Quintile Total Mean StDev Top1 Top3 HHI HS1 Breadth
1 40.9% 1.0% 1.9% 10.1% 19.5% 13.9% 25.8% 60
2 62.5% 0.7% 1.5% 10.0% 21.2% 6.9% 16.2% 159
3 74.5% 0.5% 1.3% 9.9% 21.6% 5.2% 13.3% 253
4 82.9% 0.6% 1.3% 10.2% 23.0% 4.6% 12.4% 229
5 90.6% 0.7% 1.5% 10.8% 24.7% 4.4% 11.7% 181
Overall 70.3% 0.7% 1.5% 10.2% 22.0% 7.0% 15.9% 176
Panel C: Pricing, Accounting and Analyst Coverage Data
Quintile Price Size(bi)  (Ret) σ(Ret) Arb. Risk Turnover βmkt Assets Lever. Analysts
1 185.74 5.57 0.6% 2.9% 2.73% 0.63% 0.75 1,980 0.30 3.16
2 26.68 6.84 0.6% 2.5% 2.13% 0.90% 1.00 7,864 0.32 5.50
3 34.11 7.63 0.9% 2.2% 1.85% 1.03% 1.04 23,472 0.33 7.32
4 35.01 7.60 1.6% 2.2% 1.87% 1.19% 1.09 12,849 0.31 7.78
5 33.60 7.19 -0.4% 2.3% 1.97% 1.35% 1.11 5,155 0.28 6.90
Overall 63.05 6.96 0.7% 2.4% 2.11% 1.02% 1.00 10,264 0.31 6.13
41Table III: Lending Supply & Corporate Ownership Structure
The table displays regressions of equity lending supply as a function of corporate ownership measures, with quarterly stock data from January 2005
to June 2008 of U.S. ﬁrms. Each column corresponds to a different estimator, showing results for ﬁxed-effects and Fama-Macbeth regressions. All
variables are standardized each quarter such that they have zero mean and unit standard deviation. Total is total ownership, HHI is concentration of
ownership measured by the Hirschman-Herﬁndahl index, Breadth is the number of institutional investors as in Chen, Hong, and Stein (2002), Mkt.
Cap. denotes market capitalization, DP<5 is a dummy variable equal to one if the quarterly average price is below ﬁve dollars, Turnover measures the
quarterly average of daily stock turnover, B/M the book-to-market ratio, and Momentum is the cumulative return in the previous two quarters. Q(z)
represents the quintile sorted accordingto variablez. All regressions includeyear-quarterdummies, and ﬁxed-effects’standard deviationsare clustered
at the ﬁrm level. We report standard deviations in brackets and signiﬁcance levels are indicated as follows: +=statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% level,
**=signiﬁcant at the 5% percent level, *=signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
Variable FE F-M FE F-M FE F-M FE F-M
Total 0.464+ 0.616+ 0.425+ 0.542+ 0.643+ 0.897+ 0.238+ 0.340+
[0.018] [0.023] [0.019] [0.020] [0.030] [0.044] [0.027] [0.036]
HHI -0.028∗ -0.189+ -0.040+ -0.208+
[0.015] [0.013] [0.014] [0.014]
Total*QHHI -0.052+ -0.081+
[0.007] [0.008]
Breadth 0.256+ 0.656+ 0.319+ 0.764+
[0.051] [0.052] [0.052] [0.049]
Total*QBreadth 0.074+ 0.075+
[0.009] [0.008]
Mkt. Cap. 0.323+ 0.050∗∗ 0.142∗∗ -0.477+ 0.313+ 0.071+ 0.098∗ -0.557+
[0.040] [0.021] [0.057] [0.060] [0.039] [0.020] [0.057] [0.056]
DP<5 -0.039 -0.138+ -0.053∗∗ -0.292+ -0.054∗∗ -0.159+ -0.073+ -0.341+
[0.025] [0.034] [0.025] [0.040] [0.025] [0.033] [0.025] [0.035]
Tover 0.037+ 0.017∗ 0.031+ 0.005 0.035+ 0.007 0.028+ -0.007
[0.009] [0.008] [0.009] [0.008] [0.009] [0.008] [0.009] [0.008]
B/M 0.038+ 0.086+ 0.035+ 0.070+ 0.039+ 0.092+ 0.035+ 0.073+
[0.011] [0.018] [0.011] [0.016] [0.011] [0.018] [0.011] [0.016]
Momentum -0.022+ -0.01 -0.020+ 0.003 -0.022+ -0.014 -0.021+ 0.002
[0.004] [0.009] [0.004] [0.010] [0.004] [0.008] [0.004] [0.010]
Constant -0.007 0.014+ 0.001 0.024+ -0.046+ -0.046+ -0.050+ -0.027+
[0.010] [0.003] [0.011] [0.004] [0.012] [0.005] [0.012] [0.007]
Obs. 33,251 33,251 33,251 33,251 33,251 33,251 33,251 33,251
Firms 3,385 3,385 3,385 3,385 3,385 3,385 3,385 3,385
R2 0.50 0.60 0.50 0.60 0.52 0.61 0.51 0.61
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2Table IV
Equity Loan Characteristics & Corporate Ownership Structure
The table regress equity loan characteristics as a function of ownership and voting rights structure, with quarterly
stock data from January 2005 to June 2008 of U.S. ﬁrms. Each column corresponds to a different estimator, showing
results for ﬁxed-effects and Fama-Macbeth regressions. In Panel A the dependent variable is Loan Fee deﬁned as
the quarterly average of daily loan fees weighted by loan size. Panel B displays results for the quarterly average of
the daily standard deviation of equal-weighted loan fees. All variables are standardized each quarter such that they
have zero mean and unit standard deviation. Total is total institutional ownership, HHI is concentration of ownership
measured by the Hirschman-Herﬁndahl index, Breadth is the number of institutional investors as in Chen, Hong, and
Stein (2002). All regressions include year-quarter dummies and the following control variables: Mkt. Cap. denotes
market capitalization, DP<5 is a dummy variable equal to one if the quarterly average price is below ﬁve dollars,
Turnover measures the quarterly average of daily stock turnover, B/M the book-to-market ratio, and Momentum is
the cumulative return in the previous two quarters. Fixed-effect regressions standard deviations are clustered at the
ﬁrm level. We report standard deviations in brackets and signiﬁcance levels are indicated as follows: +=statistical
signiﬁcance at the 1% level, **=signiﬁcant at the 5% percent level, *=signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
Panel A: Fee Average Panel B: Fee Volatility
Variable FE F-M FE F-M FE F-M FE F-M
Total -0.007 -0.211+ 0.015 -0.195+ -0.016 -0.243+ -0.005 -0.241+
[0.030] [0.005] [0.028] [0.007] [0.033] [0.014] [0.033] [0.011]
HHI 0.067+ 0.171+ 0.047∗ 0.126+
[0.021] [0.012] [0.027] [0.018]
Breadth -0.200+ -0.340+ -0.119∗ -0.211+
[0.063] [0.032] [0.069] [0.059]
Mkt. Cap. -0.594+ -0.087+ -0.475+ 0.166+ -0.643+ -0.111+ -0.583+ 0.04
[0.069] [0.012] [0.090] [0.023] [0.083] [0.017] [0.102] [0.038]
DP<5 -0.063 0.489+ -0.044 0.597+ -0.119∗ 0.541+ -0.110∗ 0.606+
[0.050] [0.042] [0.051] [0.045] [0.061] [0.053] [0.061] [0.058]
Tover 0.122+ 0.256+ 0.124+ 0.255+ 0.098+ 0.234+ 0.099+ 0.232+
[0.019] [0.012] [0.019] [0.011] [0.014] [0.015] [0.014] [0.014]
B/M -0.018 -0.096+ -0.015 -0.088+ -0.034 -0.085+ -0.033 -0.079+
[0.017] [0.006] [0.017] [0.005] [0.021] [0.005] [0.021] [0.004]
Momentum 0.001 -0.042+ -0.001 -0.050+ -0.018∗∗ -0.079+ -0.019∗∗ -0.083+
[0.008] [0.013] [0.008] [0.013] [0.007] [0.010] [0.007] [0.010]
Constant -0.024 -0.035+ -0.030∗∗ -0.043+ -0.027∗ -0.044+ -0.031∗∗ -0.050+
[0.015] [0.002] [0.015] [0.003] [0.015] [0.003] [0.015] [0.004]
Obs. 33,251 33,251 33,251 33,251 21,869 21,869 21,869 21,869
Firms 3,385 3,385 3,385 3,385 3,263 3,263 3,263 3,263
R2 0.08 0.20 0.07 0.19 0.08 0.22 0.08 0.21
43Table V
Equity Loan Characteristics & Corporate Ownership Structure: Specialness and Loan Type
Using quarterly stock data from January 2005 to June 2008 of U.S. ﬁrms, in Panel A we use logistic regressions to
explain the likelihood that a share is “on special” (i.e. has annualized loan fee above 100 basis points). In Panel B the
dependentvariableis the probabilityof ﬁxed-termequityloans(deﬁnedas the quarterlyaverageof the dailyfractionof
equity loans with ﬁxed-term maturity). Each panel reports estimation coefﬁcients and marginal effects, i.e., expected
changes in probability given a one standard deviation increase in an explanatory variable. Total is total institutional
ownership, HHI is concentration of ownership measured by the Hirschman-Herﬁndahl index, Breadth is the number
of institutional investors as in Chen, Hong, and Stein (2002). All regressions include year-quarter dummies and the
following control variables: Mkt. Cap. denotes market capitalization, DP<5 is a dummy variable equal to one if the
quarterly average price is below ﬁve dollars, Turnovermeasures the quarterly average of daily stock turnover,B/M the
book-to-marketratio, and Momentumis cumulative return in the previous two quarters. We report standard deviations
clustered at the ﬁrm-level in brackets and signiﬁcance levels are indicated as follows: += signiﬁcant at the 1% level,
**=signiﬁcant at the 5% percent level, *=signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
Panel A: Probability of Stock being “On Special”
Coefﬁcients Marginal Effect (Around Average)
Total -0.569+ -0.507+ Total -0.034+ -0.030+
[0.061] [0.071] [0.003] [0.004]
HHI 0.241+ HHI 0.014+
[0.038] [0.002]
Breadth -0.642+ Breadth -0.038+
[0.140] [0.008]
Obs. 33,251 33,251 Obs. 33,251 33,251
Firms 3,385 3,385 Firms 3,385 3,385
Pseudo-R2 0.27 0.27 R2 0.27 0.27
Panel B: Probability of a Fixed-Term Loan
Coefﬁcients Marginal Effect (Around Average)
Total 0.586+ 0.466+ Total 0.064+ 0.051+
[0.038] [0.043] [0.004] [0.005]
HHI -0.254+ HHI -0.028+
[0.043] [0.005]






Arbitrage Risk & Corporate Ownership Structure
The table reports results of Fama-Macbeth regressions of arbitrage risk as a function of ownership structure, with
quarterly U.S. stock data from January 2005 to June 2008. Arbitrage risk measured as the idiosyncratic risk of daily
returns based on the Carhart (1997) 4-factor model within a quarter. All variables are standardized each quarter such
that they have zero mean and unit standard deviation. Total is total institutional ownership, HHI is concentration of
ownership measured by the Hirschman-Herﬁndahl index, Breadth is the number of institutional investors as in Chen,
Hong, and Stein (2002), Mkt. Cap. denotes market capitalization, DP<5 is a dummy variable equal to one if the
quarterly average price is below ﬁve dollars, Turnovermeasures the quarterly average of daily stock turnover,B/M the
book-to-market ratio, and Momentum is the cumulative return in the previous two quarters. All regressions include
year-quarter dummies, with standard deviations clustered at the ﬁrm level. We report standard deviations in brackets
and signiﬁcance levels are indicated as follows: +=statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% level, **=signiﬁcant at the 5%
percent level, *=signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
Arbitrage Risk
Supply 0.030+ -0.061+ 0.027+ -0.075+
[0.010] [0.012] [0.010] [0.013]
Fee(VW) 0.012 0.078+ 0.014 0.084+
[0.012] [0.004] [0.012] [0.004]
Total -0.248+ -0.045+ -0.276+ -0.049+





Mkt. Cap. -0.649+ -0.393+ -0.770+ -0.402+
[0.040] [0.011] [0.056] [0.025]
DP<5 0.287+ 0.813+ 0.284+ 0.826+
[0.045] [0.033] [0.045] [0.033]
Tover 0.536+ 0.435+ 0.532+ 0.429+
[0.037] [0.012] [0.037] [0.012]
B/M -0.003 -0.073+ -0.005 -0.071+
[0.015] [0.012] [0.015] [0.012]
Momentum -0.002 -0.005 -0.001 -0.005
[0.007] [0.016] [0.007] [0.016]
Constant -0.031∗∗ -0.062+ -0.026∗ -0.063+
[0.013] [0.003] [0.013] [0.003]
Obs. 33,251 33,251 33,251 33,251
Firms 3,385 3,385 3,385 3,385
R2 0.280 0.510 0.280 0.510
45Table VII
Lending Shocks & Institutional Ownership Structure: First Month-of-Quarter
The table uses logistic regressions to explain lending supply and demand shocks as a function of lagged stock charac-
teristics, and tests for reverse causality with total institutional ownership and concentration of ownership. Price data
is from CRSP and stock ownership data from SEC’s 13F ﬁllings between January 2005 to June 2008. “All Months”
use all available monthly observations, while “First Month” only used the ﬁrst monthly observation in a given quarter.
In Panel A we present results for demand shocks: DOUT is a dummy variable equal to 1 if there is an increase in
loan fees and loaned amount relative to the previous month and DIN is a dummy variable equal to 1 if there is a
decrease in loan fees and loaned amount relative to the previous month. All variables are standardized each month
such that they have zero mean and unit standard deviation. Supply is the lending supply, Total is the quarterly total
institutional ownership, HHI is the concentrationof ownership measured by the Hirschman-Herﬁndahlindex, Breadth
is the number of institutional holders of the stock, Mkt. Cap. denotes market capitalization, Turnover is average daily
stock turnover, B/M is the book-to-market ratio, Mom1 is the stock return in the previous month, and Mom12M is
the cumulative stock return in the previous 12 months. All regressions include year-quarter dummies. Panel A reports
logit regression coefﬁcients and marginal effects, i.e., expected changes in probability given a one standard deviation
increase in an explanatory variable around its mean. In Panel B we display OLS coefﬁcients using Total and HHI as
dependent variables. We report standard deviations in brackets and signiﬁcance levels are indicated as follows: +=
signiﬁcant at the 1% level, **=signiﬁcant at the 5% percent level, *=signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
Coefﬁcients Marginal Effect (Around Average)
DOUT DIN DOUT DIN
Supplyt−1 -0.144+ 0.075+ Supplyt−1 -0.023+ 0.015+
[0.025] [0.023] [0.004] [0.004]
Totalt−1 0.182+ -0.156+ Totalt−1 0.029+ -0.031+
[0.026] [0.025] [0.004] [0.005]
HHIt−1 -0.072+ 0.03 HHIt−1 -0.012+ 0.006
[0.022] [0.021] [0.004] [0.004]
Mkt. Capt−1 -0.156+ 0.237+ Breadtht−1 -0.025+ 0.047+
[0.026] [0.027] [0.004] [0.005]
Tovert−1 -0.077+ 0.039+ Mkt. Capt−1 -0.012+ 0.008+
[0.015] [0.014] [0.002] [0.003]
B/Mt−1 -0.021 0.028∗ Tovert−1 -0.003 0.006∗
[0.016] [0.016] [0.003] [0.003]
Mom1Mt−1 0.226+ -0.197+ Mom1Mt−1 0.036+ -0.039+
[0.018] [0.021] [0.003] [0.004]
Mom12Mt−1 -0.069+ 0.042∗∗ Mom12Mt−1 -0.011+ 0.008∗∗







Stock Returns, Equity Lending Shocks & Ownership Structure–Using ﬁrst month of the
quarter with lagged variables
The table regress contemporaneous abnormal returns as a function of equity lending market shocks and corporate
ownership structure, using monthly stock data from January 2005 to June 2008 of U.S ﬁrms. Abnormal returns are
computed as the difference in monthly returns between the stock and a characteristics-matched benchmark portfolio
sorted on market capitalization, book-to-market and momentum as in Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997).
DSHIFT captures contemporaneous demand shocks, being equal to 1 if there is an increase in lending fees and loan
quantity relative to the previous month, -1 if there is a decrease in both variables, and 0 otherwise. Total is total
institutional ownership, HHI is concentration of ownership measured by the Hirschman-Herﬁndahl index, Turnover
is average monthly stock turnover. Qz represent the quintile sorted according to variable z. Regressions only include
abnormal returns on the ﬁrst month of a quarter and include calendar-month dummies. Robust standard deviations
are clustered at the ﬁrm level and shown between brackets. Signiﬁcance levels are indicated as follows: += statistical
signiﬁcance at the 1% level, *=signiﬁcant at the 5% percent level, **=signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
First month of quarter










Lag[Turnover] 0.016+ 0.018+ 0.018+
[0.004] [0.005] [0.005]
Lag[∆Turnover] 0.084+ 0.080+ 0.080+
[0.031] [0.031] [0.031]
Constant -0.565∗∗ -0.483 -0.539∗∗
[0.230] [0.326] [0.324]
Obs. 29,261 29,006 29,006
Firms 3,299 3,283 3,283
47Table IX
Robustness Test: Top1 Institutional Ownership
This table uses Top1 ownership as an alternative concentration to measure to explain lending supply, loan fee, loan
fee volatility, arbitrage risk, the probability of a stock being special, and the probability of a loan being ﬁxed-term
as dependent variables. Total is the quarterly total institutional ownership, Mkt. Cap. denotes market capitalization,
Top1 is the percentage held by the largest shareholder, Turnover is average daily stock turnover, B/M is the book-
to-market ratio, Mom1 is the stock return in the previous month, and Mom12M is the cumulative stock return in the
previous 12 months. All regressions include year-quarter dummies. We report standard deviations in brackets and
signiﬁcance levels are indicated as follows: +=statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% level, **=signiﬁcant at the 5% percent
level, *=signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
Panel A: Fama-Macbeth Regressions Panel B: Logit Regressions
Supply Fee Fee Vol Arb. Risk Specialness Loan Term
F-M F-M F-M F-M Coeff. Marg. Eff. Coeff. Marg. Eff.
Total 0.770+ -0.297+ -0.330+ -0.085+ -0.841+ -0.050+ 0.688+ 0.075+
[0.033] [0.006] [0.017] [0.011] [0.065] [0.004] [0.039] [0.004]
Top1 -0.206+ 0.072+ 0.101+ 0.047+ 0.306+ 0.019+ -0.152+ -0.015+
[0.015] [0.008] [0.008] [0.003] [0.032] [0.002] [0.025] [0.003]
Mkt. Cap. 0.066+ -0.122+ -0.127+ -0.399+ -1.023+ -0.061+ 2.615+ 0.285+
[0.020] [0.014] [0.020] [0.011] [0.080] [0.005] [0.055] [0.003]
DP<5 -0.168+ 0.539+ 0.566+ 0.823+ 0.602+ 0.042+ -0.058 -0.006
[0.034] [0.046] [0.056] [0.033] [0.100] [0.008] [0.186] [0.020]
Tover 0.013 0.248+ 0.234+ 0.434+ 0.743+ 0.044+ 0.189+ 0.021+
[0.009] [0.013] [0.014] [0.012] [0.040] [0.003] [0.032] [0.004]
B/M 0.088+ -0.096+ -0.086+ -0.073+ -0.388+ -0.023+ 0.187+ 0.020+
[0.017] [0.006] [0.005] [0.011] [0.054] [0.003] [0.032] [0.004]
Momentum -0.014 -0.042+ -0.076+ -0.004 -0.148+ -0.009+ -0.226+ -0.025+





Constant 0.016+ -0.039+ -0.047+ -0.062+ -3.284+ -0.419+
[0.003] [0.003] [0.004] [0.003] [0.104] [0.061]
Obs. 33,251 33,251 21,869 33,251 33,251 33,251 33251 33251
Firms 3,385 3,385 3,385 3,385 3,385 3,385 3263 3385
R2 0.610 0.190 0.210 0.510 0.280 0.280 0.49 0.49
48Table X
Robustness Test: HS1 Measure
This table uses institutional investor’smeasureof inﬂuence(HS1) as an alternativeconcentrationto measureto explain
lending supply, loan fee, loan fee volatility, arbitrage risk, the probability of a stock being special, and the probability
of a loan being ﬁxed-term as dependent variables. Total is the quarterly total institutional ownership, Mkt. Cap.
denotes market capitalization, HS1 measures investors’inﬂuence as in Hartzell and Starks (2003), Turnoveris average
daily stock turnover, B/M is the book-to-market ratio, Mom1 is the stock return in the previous month, and Mom12M
is the cumulative stock return in the previous 12 months. All regressions include year-quarter dummies. We report
standard deviations in brackets and signiﬁcance levels are indicated as follows: +=statistical signiﬁcance at the 1%
level, **=signiﬁcant at the 5% percent level, *=signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
Panel A: Fama-Macbeth Regressions Panel B: Logit Regressions
Supply Fee Fee Vol Arb. Risk Specialness Loan Term
F-M F-M F-M F-M Coeff. Marg. Eff. Coeff. Marg. Eff.
Total 0.770+ -0.297+ -0.330+ -0.085+ -0.841+ -0.050+ 0.688+ 0.075+
[0.033] [0.006] [0.017] [0.011] [0.065] [0.004] [0.039] [0.004]
HS1 -0.206+ 0.072+ 0.101+ 0.047+ 0.306+ 0.019+ -0.152+ -0.015+
[0.015] [0.008] [0.008] [0.003] [0.032] [0.002] [0.025] [0.003]
Mkt. Cap. 0.066+ -0.122+ -0.127+ -0.399+ -1.023+ -0.061+ 2.615+ 0.285+
[0.020] [0.014] [0.020] [0.011] [0.080] [0.005] [0.055] [0.003]
DP<5 -0.168+ 0.539+ 0.566+ 0.823+ 0.602+ 0.042+ -0.058 -0.006
[0.034] [0.046] [0.056] [0.033] [0.100] [0.008] [0.186] [0.020]
Tover 0.013 0.248+ 0.234+ 0.434+ 0.743+ 0.044+ 0.189+ 0.021+
[0.009] [0.013] [0.014] [0.012] [0.040] [0.003] [0.032] [0.004]
B/M 0.088+ -0.096+ -0.086+ -0.073+ -0.388+ -0.023+ 0.187+ 0.020+
[0.017] [0.006] [0.005] [0.011] [0.054] [0.003] [0.032] [0.004]
Momentum -0.014 -0.042+ -0.076+ -0.004 -0.148+ -0.009+ -0.226+ -0.025+





Constant 0.016+ -0.039+ -0.047+ -0.062+ -3.284+ -0.419+
[0.003] [0.003] [0.004] [0.003] [0.104] [0.061]
Obs. 33,251 33,251 21,869 33,251 33,251 33,251 33,251 33,251
Firms 3,385 3,385 3,385 3,385 3,385 3,385 3,385 3,385
R2 0.610 0.190 0.210 0.510 0.280 0.280 0.490 0.490
49Table XI
Robustness Test: Dynamic Panel Model (DPM) Regressions
This table reports results using Blundell and Bond (1998)’s dynamic panel regressions. All variables are standardized
each month such that they have zero mean and unit standard deviation. Supply is the lending supply, Total is the
quarterly total institutional ownership, HHI is the concentration of ownership measured by the Hirschman-Herﬁndahl
index, Breadth is the number of institutional holders of the stock, Mkt. Cap. denotes market capitalization, Turnover
is average daily stock turnover, B/M is the book-to-market ratio, Mom1 is the stock return in the previous month, and
Mom12Mis the cumulativestock return in the previous12 months. All regressions include year-quarterdummies. We
report standard deviations in brackets and signiﬁcance levels are indicated as follows: +=statistical signiﬁcance at the
1% level, **=signiﬁcant at the 5% percent level, *=signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
DPM Regressions
Supply Fee Fee Vol
Dep. Var.t−1 0.886+ 0.879+ 1.228+ 0.585+ 0.748+ 0.727+
[0.173] [0.170] [0.186] [0.171] [0.037] [0.077]
Dep. Var.t−2 -0.260∗ -0.269∗ -0.354∗∗ 0.266∗
[0.146] [0.142] [0.173] [0.156]
Total 0.219+ 0.141+ -0.065+ -0.089+ -0.099+ -0.257+
[0.023] [0.017] [0.015] [0.015] [0.033] [0.088]
HHI -0.123+ 0.068+ 0.088∗∗
[0.015] [0.019] [0.040]
Breadth 0.685+ -0.177+ -0.158∗
[0.083] [0.046] [0.084]
Mkt. Cap. 0.143+ -0.429+ -0.127+ -0.022 -0.1 -0.284∗∗
[0.030] [0.057] [0.024] [0.024] [0.076] [0.117]
DP<5 -0.305+ -0.396+ -0.293∗∗ -0.392+ -0.241 -1.521∗
[0.084] [0.089] [0.114] [0.120] [0.426] [0.847]
Tover 0.061+ 0.045+ 0.032+ 0.061+ 0.088+ 0.064+
[0.013] [0.012] [0.011] [0.009] [0.010] [0.017]
B/M 0.331+ 0.290+ -0.008 0.001 -0.024+ -0.034∗∗
[0.117] [0.112] [0.007] [0.005] [0.007] [0.016]
Momentum -0.361+ -0.337+ -0.016∗∗ -0.029+ -0.054+ -0.035+
[0.123] [0.119] [0.007] [0.005] [0.014] [0.013]
Obs. 22,235 22,235 22,235 22,235 16,990 16,990
Firms 2,979 2,979 2,979 2,979 3,045 3,045
Sargan-p 0.09 0.19 0.27 0.07 0.40 0.63
50Table XII
Lending Shocks & Institutional Ownership Structure: Causality
The table uses logistic regressions to examine for reverse causality in the results presented in Panel B of Table VII.
Price datais fromCRSP andstockownershipdatafromSEC’s 13Fﬁllings betweenJanuary2005to June 2008. DOUT
is a dummyvariable equal to 1 if there is an increase in loan fees and loanedamount relative to the previous monthand
DIN is a dummyvariableequalto 1 if there is a decreasein loanfees and loanedamountrelativeto the previousmonth.
All variables are standardized each month such that they have zero mean and unit standard deviation. Supply is the
lending supply, Total is the quarterly total institutional ownership, HHI is the concentrationof ownership measured by
the Hirschman-Herﬁndahl index, Mkt. Cap. denotes market capitalization, Turnover is average daily stock turnover,
B/M is the book-to-market ratio, Mom1 is the stock return in the previous month, and Mom12M is the cumulative
stock return in the previous 12 months. All regressions include year-quarter dummies. We report standard deviations
in brackets and signiﬁcance levels are indicated as follows: += signiﬁcant at the 1% level, **=signiﬁcant at the 5%








Mkt. Capt−1 0.093+ -0.260+
[0.011] [0.006]
Mom1Mt−1 0.027∗∗ -0.030+
[0.010] [0.007]
Mom12Mt−1 -0.006 -0.047+
[0.010] [0.005]
Tovert−1 0.173+ -0.092+
[0.009] [0.006]
B/Mt−1 -0.043∗∗ 0.038+
[0.018] [0.011]
Constant 0.024 -0.017
[0.018] [0.017]
Obs. 28,993 28,993
Firms 3,283 3,283
R2 0.54 0.32
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